Yandy Díaz’s New Slider Strategy

Nathan Ray Seebeck-Imagn Photographs

Should you’re a serious league hitter, you’ll attain a two-strike depend. Not each time – baseball isn’t an each time sport – however regularly, persistently, inevitably. In these two-strike counts, you’re going to see sliders. Once more, not each time, however regularly. 1 / 4 of two-strike pitches within the majors this yr have been sliders of some selection. Pitchers aren’t any dummies, and so they know the place their bread is buttered.

The worst factor that might occur with these two-strike sliders you’re sure to face? A strikeout, clearly. However dangerous information: There are going to be strikeouts. Once more, not each time, however strikeouts are only a reality of life in baseball today, and 21% of two-strike sliders have resulted in strikeouts this yr. Not within the plate look – on that pitch particularly. No marvel pitchers throw so a lot of them.

With all that in thoughts, right here’s a press release I’m positive you’ll agree with: A great way to get higher at hitting is to cease placing out on two-strike sliders. I imply, this isn’t rocket science. Hanging out is dangerous. Doing it much less is nice. Thanks for coming to my TED discuss.

Oh, proper, I suppose I nonetheless should let you know what this text is about. Let’s speak about a participant who made a heroic change. Early in his profession, he did a good job defending towards sliders with two strikes (15.4% putaway price on two-strike sliders). In 2023, although, issues took a flip; he struck out on 20% of the two-strike sliders he noticed. This yr, nevertheless, he’s defending towards them higher than ever. No participant in baseball has gone down much less regularly towards two-strike sliders than our thriller man’s 8.6% clip. Pitchers merely can’t get him out. He’s placing up an excellent 118 wRC+ and placing out much less typically than final yr.

There’s only one drawback: Our blind merchandise participant is Yandy Díaz. And whereas he’s having a suitable season this yr, it’s miles worse than final yr’s marketing campaign, when he was swinging and lacking in any respect these two-strike sliders. He’s not even doing higher with two strikes. His batting common, on-base share, and slugging share in two-strike counts have all declined this yr, each towards sliders and general.

If this appears like fairly the conundrum, that’s as a result of it’s. The important thing growth of baseball over the previous decade has been pitchers more and more looking strikeouts. I don’t want to indicate you a kind of charts of slider price over time; all you need to do is watch a sport. They’re utilizing the pitch extra as a result of it really works, and one of many key methods it really works is by lacking bats in advantageous counts. Sliders are the most effective strikeout weapon in trendy baseball.

Nevertheless, the opposite facet of that is an inconvenient fact for individuals who like balls in play and motion. Let’s take Díaz for example. He’s utterly modified his conduct towards sliders this yr as in comparison with final yr. It’s not a pitch recognition factor. He swung at two-strike sliders off the plate (within the Chase and Waste zones outlined by Baseball Savant) 23% of the time final yr, and that’s as much as 26% this yr, every in small samples. He’s defending sliders over the plate at roughly the identical price: 98% final yr, 94% this yr. He’s not even getting fooled much less by completely positioned sliders simply off of the sting of the zone; he swung at 78% of these final yr and 82% up to now this yr.

No, Díaz made a very completely different change: He simply stopped lacking. Final yr, he swung at 71 two-strike sliders that weren’t over the lifeless center of the plate. In different phrases, these are the pitches that had been, kind of, executed the best way the opposing pitcher wished. He got here up empty on 35% of these swings. That’s not disastrous or something – the league common is round 37%. This yr, he’s right down to a 14.5% whiff price, which is the bottom in baseball, only a hair forward of contact god Luis Arraez, who has gone greater than a month with out placing out. Final yr, Díaz whiffed on 27% of down-the-middle sliders on two strikes. This yr, he’s at 3.6%, one whiff on 28 swings.

We don’t have bat monitoring knowledge for 2023, which is a disgrace, however there’s a straightforward assumption to make right here. How do you retain your swing choices unchanged and but make contact at a far greater price? By taking a much less violent swing. You possibly can see it within the numbers. He’s hitting the ball meaningfully softer when he presents at two-strike sliders. His hard-hit price when he places one in play has dipped from 54% to 36%, and he’s had over roughly 100 balls in play in annually, so not a tiny pattern.

Onerous-hit price is hardly the one change right here. His common exit velocity and ninetieth percentile exit velocity are means down on these swings. His floor contact, particularly, is totally abysmal. We’re speaking 83.4 common exit velocity, .174 slugging share depressing. He’s chopping the ball into the bottom relatively than taking a strikeout, which is an efficient discount – solely we’re speaking about 23 further grounders this yr, which is a ton.

This explicit change in Díaz’s sport has permeated the remainder of his offensive strategy. He’s performing worse towards each sort of slider regardless of making contact with them extra typically, and it’s all resulting from contact high quality. Should you’re in search of it in xwOBA phrases, he punished the sliders he put in play final yr to the tune of a .506 xwOBA. This yr he’s right down to .376. That’s the distinction between Giancarlo Stanton’s manufacturing on contact and Edmundo Sosa’s. Saving the odd strikeout right here or there can’t probably make up for that sort of swing.

I don’t know if this alteration is intentional. It’s definitely placing, although, as a result of the change in conduct appears restricted to breaking balls. In opposition to fastballs, little or no has modified. There, his hard-hit price is actually unchanged, and whereas he’s hitting the ball on the bottom a bit extra typically, that needed to be anticipated after his profession yr in 2023. Likewise, he’s mainly the identical participant when he swings at changeups and splitters; he’s truly hitting these pitches a bit more durable this yr, although in a small pattern. He’s additionally getting higher outcomes. However towards flexible stuff – largely sliders, however curves as properly – every little thing has gone improper.

Right here’s the soiled secret about sliders: As a lot because the swings and misses are interesting, batters altering their strategy and sacrificing contact high quality works simply as properly for the protection. Pitchers will gladly sacrifice a couple of strikeouts if it means somebody with Díaz’s uncooked energy is slapping the ball on the bottom.

Right here’s one other means of taking a look at it: Díaz has seen 51 sliders this yr the place our PitchingBot mannequin thinks that a mean hitter would hit a house run at the very least 2% of the time. You possibly can consider these as crushable sliders; the common residence run chance of all sliders he’s seen this yr is just 0.6%. He’s hit one homer on these 51 pitches. General, his complete manufacturing on these sliders – and bear in mind, these are the worst he’s seen all yr – is 1.5 runs above common relative to a random pitch. That’s fairly depressing. For comparability’s sake, he noticed 61 final yr and hit three homers on the best way to being 5.1 runs above common.

There are a couple of methods to beat pitchers who throw you too many sliders. First, you possibly can spit on those that aren’t within the zone. We’ve already established that Díaz hasn’t modified his swing price, although, in order that one’s out. Second, you possibly can punish the dangerous ones. Announcers speak about hanging sliders on a regular basis. It’s an actual danger! Should you depart one sitting up over the plate, good hitters can crank it out of the park. However they’re quite a bit much less seemingly to do this in the event that they’re centered closely on making contact. The swing that you simply use to make contact with an excellent slider and the one you employ to deposit a foul one within the outfield seats in all probability aren’t the very same.

Perhaps that is all simply coincidence. There’s definitely some likelihood that these two issues – fewer whiffs and worse contact high quality – simply randomly occurred directly. However that doesn’t appear significantly seemingly, and it significantly doesn’t appear seemingly that somebody like Díaz would have each occur to him with no company in any way.

In truth, among the hitters who’ve made the alternative change are seeing the ends in reverse. Ketel Marte is placing out on two-strike sliders extra regularly than ever earlier than, and but he’s having maybe his finest yr. I’m simply cherry choosing examples, although; there’s little or no correlation between change in two-strike slider putaway price and alter in offensive manufacturing.

What does all of this imply? For me, there’s one key takeaway: You possibly can’t simply do away with dangerous outcomes with out giving one thing else up. Hitting is all about tradeoffs, and considering rigorously about which of them you make is essential. Some hitters minimize down on their slider putaway price and see enormous returns – Ryan O’Hearn is a good instance right here. Some hitters strike out extra regularly on sliders and likewise do worse general – suppose Jeimer Candelario. You possibly can’t simply take a look at one statistic, even one which appears as uncomplicated and essential as, “Do you strike out an excessive amount of towards sliders?” and get a transparent reply. Hitting is tough! There aren’t any easy options. Simply ask Yandy Díaz.

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